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The Public Square Has Eyes (or Cameras):
Anonymous Speech Under the First and
Fourth Amendments in the Age of Facial
Recognition
Apratim Vidyarthi*
Facial recognition technology (“FRT”)—once a futuristic fantasy—is more pervasive than ever and shows no signs of becoming
less prevalent. While this technology has its upsides, it elicits the
notion of an omnipresent being that is watching and tracking us all
the time. FRTs encroach on the First Amendment right to anonymous speech by revealing the identity of speakers and chilling
speech. Yet, First Amendment doctrine does not provide much solace, since the right to anonymous speech regulates the government’s
ability to force disclosure of a speaker’s identity rather than preventing it from collecting publicly available facial data. The right to
anonymous speech also clashes with private actors’ right to collect
and disseminate information, which provides an avenue for private
actors to destroy anonymity. And private actors’ First Amendment
rights allow them to collect and develop FRT they can use in private
spaces.
In addition to inadequate speech rights, litigating FRTs’ impacts
on the right to anonymous speech is likely to face significant barriers in court. Specifically, plaintiffs will find it hard to show they have
been affected by these systems and that their speech has been
*
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chilled, giving them no standing. Further, courts’ deference to the
legislative and executive branches on issues of crime control and
national security might justify an encroachment on the right to
anonymous speech. Finally, private parties’ rights to collect and
disseminate information pose serious barriers to challenge privately-operated FRTs and provides the government an additional
avenue to gather facial data and track individuals. Prophylactic legislation is a stronger solution to remedy the issues caused by FRT.
Such legislation can regulate the government’s use of FRT, private
actors’ implementations of FRT, and the very creation of FRTs
themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
A face is worth a thousand words. Faces show feelings, reveal
intentions, and carry the baggage of race, gender, religion, and perhaps socioeconomic status. Even a half-covered face, protected by a
mask during a once-in-a-century pandemic, still manages to convey
considerable information. Taken together, what a face reveals is not
just a temporal reality but an image of the permanent self:1 an inescapable fact, proof of our existence, and evidence of our presence.
Unlike the transience of Donald Trump’s Twitter account2 or the
fleeting existence of parts of the Watergate tapes, our faces are permanent identifiers, providing us with alibis, but also providing observers with a beacon to track, identify, and incriminate or exonerate.3
While flying cars, teleportation, and facial recognition have been
mainstays of our imagination–—from The Jetsons to James Bond to
the Halo video games—facial recognition technology (“FRT”) is
slowly becoming a norm, fueled by humans’ permanent and

1

Perhaps, except for Clark Kent, for whom glasses completely changed his identity and
rendered his true identity entirely invisible. See Michael Jung, Superman’s Glasses Are
Secretly More Than Just a Disguise, SCREEN RANT (July 21, 2020), https://screenrant.com/
superman-glasses-secret-power-disguise/ [https://perma.cc/T4MD-KMJ7].
2
See, e.g., @realdonaldtrump, TWITTER, https://mobile.twitter.com/realdonaldtrump
[https://perma.cc/3VRM-JMC8] (last accessed Oct. 12, 2021) (showing that FormerPresident Donald Trump’s Twitter account has been suspended).
3
See, e.g., Lincoln Michel, How Curb Your Enthusiasm Saved a Man from Death Row,
GQ (June 9, 2018), https://www.gq.com/story/how-curb-your-enthusiasm-saved-a-manfrom-death-row [https://perma.cc/8E24-9RV5] (describing the story of a man exonerated
after evidence showing him present in a Curb Your Enthusiasm clip provided an alibi).
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identifying characteristics.4 But, due to a face’s permanent nature,
facial recognition is not just a step toward realizing our fantastical
futures. Instead, it poses risks: the risk of companies and governments tracking citizens, chilling speech, and removing the veil of
anonymity from the public square. Where a photo accidentally capturing a face is a snapshot of a specific time and place, FRT has the
capacity to identify a person across time and space, creating an invasive profile of where they have been, with whom they are associated, and what they are doing. Semantically, this is no different from
many photographs being taken in succession. However, FRT’s role
in the public sphere creates unease—a feeling of being watched; discomfort with the potential to misinterpret a person’s action or association; and a loss of inherent anonymity that was historically expected when part of a crowd.
This discomfort crystallized when the New York Times revealed
that Clearview AI was scraping photographs from the internet.5 The
advanced artificial intelligence company was using the thousands of
photographs on the internet as data to develop a facial recognition
software and selling the technology to police and law enforcement
agencies.6 Can individuals talk in public without the fear of being
identified and having their speech and actions be policed? How does
the public deal with the use of FRT by the government or a shadowy
company that is increasing the already disparate power of police and
law enforcement agencies? The public’s right to free speech and
open communication, as well as the underlying principles of selfrecognition and freedom of thought, are threatened by the prevalence of such technologies. This perceived encroachment of our civil
liberties is reflected in the ongoing litigation against Clearview AI.7

4

See, e.g., Antoaneta Roussi, Resisting the Rise of Facial Recognition, 587 NATURE
350 (Nov. 19, 2020), https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-02003188-2/d41586-020-03188-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4W3-NEMB] (describing the global
growth of FRT).
5
Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearviewprivacy-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/PL7D-C892].
6
Id.
7
Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241, 1242 (7th Cir. 2021).
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It is no surprise that FRT implicates the First Amendment in
more ways than one. For example, broad surveillance-like FRT may
“chill association through overreaching relational surveillance,” impacting the First Amendment’s freedom of association guarantees.8
And although the First Amendment is supposed to promote freedom
of thought and foster ideas, surveillance hinders these freedoms.9 A
corollary to these First Amendment tenets is the right to anonymous
speech, which allows citizens to be free from disclosing their identities to the government when they are speaking.10 Current conceptions of the First Amendment’s right to anonymous speech are limited to published literature and political speech.11 This is partly because the Fourth Amendment is the traditional modality for challenging government surveillance and encouraging privacy.12 Yet,
the impact of FRT extends beyond just surveillance and privacy: it
impacts discourse, speech, and behavior in the public sphere.13 The
First Amendment, through the right to anonymous speech, should
protect against FRTs that chill speech.
This Article investigates why the First Amendment’s right to
anonymous speech does not protect against FRTs. It further explores
how the First Amendment fails to provide a cause of action against
public and private institutions that employ FRTs. As the Supreme
Court has currently framed it, the right to anonymous speech is a
right against disclosure, rather than one that prevents the collection
of publicly available data, making it an unusable tool against
FRTs.14 Additionally, the right to anonymous speech clashes with
other First Amendment rights to collect and disseminate
8

Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 741 (2008).
9
See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First
Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV.
465, 467 (2015) (describing how surveillance undermines the primary tenets of the First
Amendment).
10
See infra Part I.A.
11
Id.
12
For a more detailed analysis of the privacy theory behind First and Fourth
Amendments as applied to government data surveillance, see generally MARTIN KUHN,
FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
(2007) (analyzing privacy theory as it pertains to data surveillance).
13
See infra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
14
See infra Part I.A.
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information. Further, even if these doctrinal questions were not at
issue, litigating the use of FRT would run into significant hurdles.
A more feasible approach to realizing the right to anonymous speech
against FRTs is through legislation and regulation.
Part I explores the doctrinal history of the First Amendment’s
right to anonymous speech as one that focuses on preventing the
disclosure of a speaker’s identity, rather than one that prevents the
collection of publicly available data. Part I also explores how the
First Amendment’s right to collect and disseminate information
might conflict with the right to anonymous speech, and how the
Fourth Amendment may inform this analysis. Part II explains what
facial recognition is, how the government and private actors’ use of
FRT implicates the First Amendment in the context of anonymous
speech, and how there may be tangential Fourth Amendment implications. Part III discusses issues that could arise when bringing a
claim against a party using FRT, including difficulties with attaining
standing, the Court’s deference to national security and policing issues, and conflict with the right to collect and disseminate information by private entities. Finally, Part IV examines possible legislative solutions against the government, as well as ways to regulate
private actors and FRT itself.
I. THE DOCTRINAL HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS
SPEECH
The history of the right to anonymous speech under the First
Amendment started in the late 1950s, beginning with an allusion in
NAACP v. Alabama.15 However, the modern era of politics, combined with changing media ecosystems, has seen more cases flesh
out this right. Even so, the right to anonymous speech clashes and
competes with the right to collect and disseminate information. The
Fourth Amendment complicates the picture, providing some solace,
but also leaving questions unanswered regarding the extent of governmental authority.

15

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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A. The First Amendment Right to Anonymous Speech
The First Amendment prohibits the government from making
any law that abridges “the freedom of speech, or of the press.”16 A
corollary of the right to free speech is the right to anonymous speech.
The right to anonymous speech has a jurisprudential history that
starts in the late 1950s and spans a variety of cases. While most
anonymous speech cases deal with political speech and advocacy,
some raise questions about the nexus between First and Fourth
Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court first alluded to the right to anonymous
speech in NAACP v. Alabama.17 There, Alabama asked the Court to
compel the NAACP to produce a list of its members.18 The Court
did not explicitly rule on First Amendment grounds and instead
ruled on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds (which the
Court noted implicates freedom of speech, though never expressly
mentioning the First Amendment) that the production of the membership list would violate freedom of association rights, especially
“where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”19 The Court then explicitly pinpointed the notion of the right to anonymous speech in Talley
v. California, where it struck down a Los Angeles ordinance requiring flyers to include the names and addresses of its publishers on the
flyers.20 In doing so, the Court noted that anonymity can be used for
constructive purposes (exemplified by the Federalist Papers).21
Thus, under Talley the Court’s approach was to limit government
authority by preventing the government from requiring identity disclosure.22

16

U.S. CONST. amend I.
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
18
Id. at 451.
19
Id. at 462. An additional lens through which to look at NAACP’s ruling, is that a
disclosure of such lists affects freedom of association by chilling relations between
members and organizations whose images or beliefs may be frowned upon societally.
Strandburg, supra note 8, at 786–88.
20
362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960).
21
Id.
22
Id. This approach is far more limited compared to prohibiting the collection or
monitoring of identifying information that is publicly available. And given the facts of the
case, such a rule makes far more sense than this broader conception of anonymous speech.
17
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After these movements toward anonymous speech, in Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, the Court noted a limit to the right to anonymous speech
through limited disclosure, writing:
Where the mask of anonymity which an organization’s members wear serves the double purpose of
protecting them from popular prejudice and of enabling them to cover over a foreign-directed conspiracy, infiltrate into other groups, and enlist the support
of persons who would not, if the truth were revealed,
lend their support, it would be a distortion of the First
Amendment to hold that it prohibits Congress from
removing the mask.23
While the Court was not dealing explicitly with a traditional “right
to anonymous speech” case, this remark indicates that the right to
anonymous speech has limits in the realm of national security. Subsequently, in Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Court implicitly
noted that along with the right to anonymous speech, the First
Amendment guarantees the right to receive information anonymously.24 After these ambiguous genesis cases, the Court did not
solidify the right to anonymous speech for almost thirty years. The
subsequent cases address anonymous speech through limited identity disclosure.
In 1995, the Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
struck down an ordinance similar to that in Talley, but specifically
aimed at political leaflets.25 It explicitly ruled that “[t]he freedom to
publish anonymously extends beyond the literary realm.”26 Soon after, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court noted that the right to anonymous and private speech encourages the uninhibited exchange of
ideas, whereas “the fear of public disclosure of private conversations
might well have a chilling effect on private speech.”27 Even so, the
Court struck down state and federal statutes that forbade individuals

23
24
25
26
27

367 U.S. 1, 102–03 (1961).
381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
Id.
532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
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from recording intercepted private conversations, noting that the anonymity interest could not justify the statutes’ restrictions on the interceptors’ speech.28 The Court then reaffirmed McIntyre’s right to
anonymous speech in Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton, striking down an ordinance that required a permit to distribute door-todoor advocacy, since anonymous speech is protected by the First
Amendment.29 In doing so, the Court noted that one of the benefits
of anonymous speech is that it allows individuals to advocate for
unpopular causes.30 Nearing the end of the political advocacy cases,
in Citizens United v. FEC, Justice Thomas concurred with the striking down of the FEC’s campaign finance disclosure requirements
and reaffirmed McIntyre, reiterating that the right to anonymity is
still pertinent in the modern context.31 Finally and most recently, in
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, the Court invalidated an overbroad disclosure law in California that required charitable organizations to disclose the identities of their major donors to
the state Attorney General’s Office.32 Citing NAACP and its descendants, the Court noted that the California law placed too high a
burden on donors’ associational rights33 and did not pass strict scrutiny.34
This line of cases distinctly takes a disclosure approach, striking
down ordinances that require distributors of print media to disclose
or register their identities with the government to be allowed to conduct speech-related activities. However, this disclosure approach
seems inadequate. The secrecy paradigm notes that an individual has
a privacy interest in ensuring that secret or private information remains secret.35 The disclosure of such information destroys that

28

Id. at 534–35.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167
(2002).
30
Id.
31
558 U.S. 310, 480 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
32
141 S. Ct. 2373, 2385 (2021).
33
Id. at 2383.
34
Id. at 2384. Note, however, that Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch disagreed about
the level of scrutiny that should be applied to all such cases. Id. at 2389–91 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 2391–92 (Alito, J., concurring).
35
Benjamin Zhu, Note, A Traditional Tort for a Modern Threat: Applying Intrusion
Upon Seclusion to Dataveillance Observations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2396–400 (2014).
29
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privacy interest.36 But our facial identities are continuously disclosed to the public despite a privacy interest in concealing our facial identities if we would like to remain anonymous. Thus, disclosing our facial identities to the public is not disclosing private information to the public because our faces are never “secret.” In other
words, our faces are de facto a part of the public sphere, even though
we have a privacy interest in keeping our faces or presence anonymous or secret. A broader conception that would protect anonymous
speech under the secrecy paradigm is one that prevents the government from collecting or monitoring information about a speaker’s
speech or presence, thus keeping our presence anonymous. Preventing the collection or monitoring of faces implicates anonymous
speech, because collecting or monitoring faces, by definition, destroys the speaker’s anonymity and thus their right to anonymous
speech.
Unfortunately, most lower court cases substantiate the disclosure approach. For example, in Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v.
Baltimore Police Department, the Fourth Circuit considered an aerial monitoring program that used camera-equipped airplanes to track
the movements of people to fight violent crimes.37 Rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the program violated their First Amendment
right to freely associate, the court noted that “people do not have a
right to avoid being seen in public places. And even if that were not
so, it is a stretch to suggest people are deterred from associating with
each other [by the program] . . . .”38 This is the disclosure approach
in full visibility. This approach is substantiated by a variety of lower
court cases that interpret McIntyre as implementing such an antidisclosure rule.39 In contrast, few cases interpret the First

36

Id.
979 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2020), rev’d en banc, 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021). Note
that the reversal en banc was under Fourth Amendment reasoning, rather than the prior
First Amendment reasoning. Id. at 341–48.
38
Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, 979 F.3d at 232.
39
See, e.g., Yes for Life PAC v. Webster, 74 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40–41 (D. Me. 1999)
(“[T]he Court’s references [in McIntyre and Buckley II] to information about sources and
amount of money were in the context of disclosures to state regulatory authorities, not as
attachments to First Amendment communications.”); Ky. Right to Life v. Terry, 108 F.3d
637, 648 (6th Cir. 1997) (framing McIntyre’s reasoning as concluding that “additional First
Amendment burdens exacted by requiring identification disclaimers on issue advocacy
37

640

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:630

Amendment right to anonymous speech—and troublingly, any First
Amendment rights at all—as a restriction on the government’s ability to collect publicly available facial data. United States v. United
States District Court is the only Supreme Court case that alludes to
First Amendment issues with governmental collecting/monitoring
of facial data, and the Court only briefly mentions that government
surveillance systems may chill political speech and dissent.40
Even when faced with the perfect fact pattern of government
collection and monitoring of (ostensibly) freely-available data,
lower courts have still taken the disclosure approach, protecting free
expression by preventing the disclosure of the speaker’s identity.41
For example, in Doe v. Harris, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
a regulation that required sex offenders to provide law enforcement
agencies with a list of online accounts and identifiers violated the
First Amendment.42 Citing McIntyre, the court struck down the regulation and noted its chilling effect on anonymous speech because
the regulation “too freely allow[ed] law enforcement to disclose sex
offenders’ Internet identifying information to the public.”43 Even
here—with the perfect setup of digital anonymous speech and the
government’s coercive collection of online identifiers—the court refused to take the broader collecting/monitoring approach.44 The
Fourth Circuit took a similar approach to online anonymity in Washington Post v. McManus, striking down a Maryland state law that
expenditures” outweighed the state’s interest in identifying proponents of issue advocacy)
(emphasis added); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 387–88 (2d Cir.
2000) (phrasing McIntyre as a disclosure requirement ruling); Calzone v. Summers, 942
F.3d 415, 425 (8th Cir. 2019) (noting that “speakers ordinarily have the right to keep their
identities private” and that the “right to remain nameless” is protected by the First
Amendment, as per McIntyre; this implicates a prevention of disclosure of identity, rather
than its collection); ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 991 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing
McIntyre and its progeny as implicating “state reporting and disclosure statutes”); Worley
v. Cruz-Bustillo, 717 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013).
40
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
41
For a detailed discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of expression and disclosure
under the First Amendment (which is generally beyond the scope of this Article), see
Margot E. Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law
to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 833–
42 (2012).
42
772 F.3d 563, 568–69 (9th Cir. 2014).
43
Id. at 578–80 (emphasis added).
44
Id.
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required online platforms to collect and disclose online political advertisement purchases, also citing McIntyre.45
The problems do not stop with courts’ limited disclosure approach in protecting anonymous speech. Courts also recognize that
anonymous speech is not absolute and can be curtailed through two
means: (1) where the government’s policies meet the “exacting scrutiny” test noted in Doe v. Reed; or (2) through the publication of
information by private parties.46 In Reed, the Court upheld a law that
allowed the state to disclose the names and addresses of those who
signed referendum petitions due to the state’s need to “preserv[e]
the integrity of the electoral process.”47 The Court applied exacting
scrutiny, requiring “a ‘substantial relation’ between the [policy] and
a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest,” thus slotting the
test between intermediate and strict scrutiny.48 In considering the
governmental interest, courts balance the regulation’s degree of impact and the degree of justification required.49 Often, however, this
balance weighs in favor of curtailing anonymous speech, especially
where the impacts on speech are limited and the justification relates
to national security investigative efforts.50 Combined with the already limited disclosure approach, courts’ implementation of “exacting scrutiny” further constrains the right to anonymous speech.

45

944 F.3d 506, 511–15 (4th Cir. 2019).
See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
47
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 197 (2010).
48
Id. at 196.
49
See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., 525 U.S. 182, 195–96 (1999) (upholding
a Colorado constitutional amendment requiring disclosure of identity in circulating
petitions for constitutional amendments, the Court balanced the ease of registration to vote
and the governmental justification of preventing lawbreakers amongst petition circulators);
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1988) (rejecting a Colorado law that would forbid
the use of paid petitioners, the Court balanced the reduction of political discourse, versus
the (inadequate) justification of protecting the integrity of the process).
50
See Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1319–20 (1974) (upholding
the FBI’s surveillance of the Socialist Workers Party, given that the nature of the proposed
monitoring was limited). Another line of cases that upholds anti-anonymity statutes has to
do with anti-mask statutes that states have passed to prohibit people from wearing masks
in public. In some cases, these statutes have been upheld by the courts, despite the right to
anonymous speech; in other cases, these statutes have been struck down. The framing of
the statute and the standard applied matter greatly. Kaminski, supra note 41, at 848–73.
46
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Lower courts have adopted this balancing approach. In In re
Anonymous Online Speakers, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
a lower court’s broad discovery order to disclose the identity of
anonymous online speakers violated the First Amendment.51 The
court balanced the value of anonymous speech against the need for
discovery of the speakers’ identities.52 The court ultimately required
the plaintiff, a competing business, to show they had a clear claim
before such information could be discovered.53 On the other hand,
where a government request (rather than a private business’ request)
for anonymous users’ confidential information or internet data is issued through a narrow subpoena rather than a broad discovery order,
courts have found that the marginal impact on user privacy and trust
can be outweighed by advancements to the governments’ legal
case.54 Finally, where private parties request copyright enforcement,
the balance is between the public’s interest in untainted speech and
the private party’s interest in protecting its intellectual property.55
These cases reveal the boundaries of the right to anonymous speech
and show that “the degree of scrutiny varies depending on the circumstances and the type of speech at issue.”56
Private parties can also defeat the right to anonymity generally
(which encompasses the narrower right to anonymous speech) by
using their own speech. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the
Daily Mail published the name of a fourteen-year-old boy who was
a school shooting assailant.57 The Court struck down a law that prevented newspapers from publishing the names of juvenile delinquents since the law did not satisfy exacting scrutiny.58 The newspapers’ right to speak, publish, and inform the public trumped the
anonymity needs of the juvenile assailant.59 Additionally, private
parties who obtain information from the government can also defeat
the right to anonymity. For example, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., a
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

661 F.3d 1168, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1176.
Id.
See Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 680–84 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
In re DMCA Subpoena to Reddit, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 3d 900, 912–14 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
Id. at 910.
443 U.S. 97, 99–100 (1979).
Id. at 102.
Id. at 105–06.
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Florida newspaper lawfully obtained the name of a rape victim from
the government and published it.60 The Court found that because the
information was lawfully obtained, imposing damages on the newspaper would violate the newspaper’s First Amendment rights—despite impacting the respondent’s privacy and anonymity rights.61
This brief history leads to two conclusions. First, the right to
anonymous speech protects speakers against forced identity disclosure to the government when engaging in speech, and courts apply
at least exacting scrutiny to laws impacting this right. However, the
right is more limited than enforcing a right to anonymous speech by
preventing the government from monitoring speakers or collecting
their information about their identities. Second, once a private party
obtains the identity of a speaker, the private party’s First Amendment rights to publish that information may overcome the individual’s right to anonymity.
B. The Right to Collect and Disseminate Information
Private parties’ ability to collect and disseminate information
undermines this already limited right to anonymous speech.62 One
party’s First Amendment right to disseminate information about another individual’s identity can encroach on the latter person’s anonymity. And even if the disseminating party does not release information related to the speaker’s identity, the mere collection and collation of data can undermine a speaker’s anonymity. In the context
of private surveillance or FRTs, private actors can implement FRTs
because of their right to collect and disseminate information.
In Bartnicki, the Court ruled that the private collection and dissemination of information is protected by the First Amendment.63
Even if a private party does not collect first-hand information, it can
use and disseminate data that is available widely and has other permissible uses. For example, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court
struck down a Vermont statute prohibiting pharmacies from
60

491 U.S. 524, 526–28 (1989).
Id. at 532.
62
For a more nuanced discussion of the right to gather information, see generally Barry
P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic
Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (2004).
63
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001).
61
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disclosing prescriber-identifying information (such as the names of
prescribing doctors) and using such data for marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers.64 The Court ruled that because the prescriber-identifying information at issue was widely available and
had many uses, preventing some speakers from using and disseminating it did not satisfy strict scrutiny.65 Finally, in a case striking
down a similar statute in Virginia, the Court noted that a consumer’s
interest “in the free flow of commercial information” is protected by
the First Amendment.66
The clash between the right to collect/disseminate information
and the right to anonymous speech could easily be resolved by distinguishing between what kinds of information can be collected under each right. But the First Amendment right to collect and disseminate is broad, and its maximal interpretation arguably applies to
most forms of data that “create[] knowledge,”67 as a “prerequisite
for free expression.”68 In contrast, the right to anonymous speech is
not maximalist but is limited: it applies only against the government’s ability to require disclosure of a speaker’s identity.69 And
some courts do not consider conduct that encourages anonymity
(like mask-wearing) as speech, but instead as conduct which is unprotected under the First Amendment.70 Of course, which right prevails depends on the circumstances of the case; but, it is safe to say
that a private entity’s collection and distribution of a speaker’s identity can undermine anonymity and the right to anonymous speech,
which only protects against forced disclosures to the government.71
Nonetheless, governmental regulations protecting anonymity or
64

564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011).
Id. at 573.
66
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976) (emphasis added).
67
Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59–60 (2014). But see G.S.
Hans, No Exit: Ten Years of “Privacy vs. Speech” Post-Sorrell, 65 WASH. UNIV. J.L. &
POL’Y 19, 25–26 (2021) (criticizing Bambauer’s approach of framing most data collection
as covered by the First Amendment as an approach that favors massive data collection and
where the legal concept of privacy would not “meaningfully survive”).
68
Bambauer, supra note 67, at 86.
69
See supra Part I.A.
70
Kaminski, supra note 41, at 862–74. And with mask-wearing, intent plays a factor in
whether the anonymity is protected. Id.
71
See supra Part I.A.
65
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privacy in the face of a private actor’s right to collect and disseminate speech can survive heightened scrutiny, especially if the governmental interests are defined adequately.72
Another way to combat private parties’ right to the collection
and dissemination of information is through the privacy, liberty,
statutory, and constitutional rights of other parties. In Branzburg v.
Hayes, the Court affirmed that a newspaper reporter had to appear
before a grand jury, because the public’s interest in law enforcement
and effective grand jury proceedings overrode the petitioner’s information-gathering rights.73 In so ruling, the Court noted that while
newspapers can collect some information, there are limitations:
newspapers cannot “circulate . . . reckless falsehoods damaging to
private reputation . . . . [They] may also be punished for contempt
of court . . . .”74 In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, the Court upheld
a protective order preventing a newspaper from disseminating information obtained through court-mandated discovery procedures, because it could have resulted in “annoyance, embarrassment and even
oppression.”75 And in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the
Court upheld the Material Support Statute’s provisions preventing
respondents from providing legal training or advocacy (i.e., engaging in their First Amendment rights) to foreign groups deemed terrorist organizations, because the government identified such groups
as national security threats.76 Nonetheless, the Court has made clear
that where the government aims to prevent the dissemination of information, it “carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
imposition of such a restraint.”77

72

See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L.
REV. 1113, 1115–18 (2015) (defining the government’s interest in providing notice to
individuals and preserving some situations as surveillance-free). For a more thorough
discussion of what this legislation could look like, see infra Part IV.B.
73
See 408 U.S. 665, 683–86 (1972).
74
Id. at 683–84.
75
467 U.S. 20, 21–29, 37 (1984).
76
561 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2010) (upholding the statute that prevented petitioners from
providing political advocacy and legal training to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).
77
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (quoting Org.
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
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However, when it comes to collecting information about public
officials or in public places, lower courts tend to favor First Amendment rights to collect and disseminate information. For example,
some states prevent secretly recording another person’s words without their consent.78 But the First Circuit found such a prohibition
overbroad, not satisfying intermediate scrutiny, because it prohibits
recordings of police officers “discharging their official duties in
public spaces.”79 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) agents may be unable to prevent individuals from photographing and recording matters of public interest,
including agents in CBP facilities.80 Further, the Tenth Circuit ruled
that statutes targeting the creation of speech by imposing heightened
penalties on those who collect data in public or public-adjacent
spaces are unconstitutional.81 Together, these rulings indicate that
recording and collecting data in public spaces, at least when directed
at public officials, are protected First Amendment activities. However, in some cases, the government can articulate interests, such as
an interest in privacy, that withstand the applicable level of scrutiny
and prohibits public recording.82 But these interests must be framed
in the right manner, accompanied by adequately narrow laws.83
Thus, the collection and dissemination of information, especially in public spaces, is generally protected. However, the collation of publicly available data creates new issues regarding anonymity. In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, the Court noted that disclosure of
78

Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (requiring the consent of all parties to a
confidential communication), with N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250.00, 250.05 (making it a crime
to record or eavesdrop on a conversation unless at least one party (i.e. the recording party)
consents).
79
Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 817 (1st Cir. 2020); see also
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2017) (making a similar ruling,
stating that private individuals have a First Amendment right to observe and record police
officers engaged in the public discharge of their duties).
80
Askins v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2018).
81
W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1192 (10th Cir. 2017).
82
See Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 171–
73 (2017) (providing a more detailed discussion of what interests can withstand heightened
scrutiny).
83
See id. at 199–218 (describing the need for the right temporal/spatial location and
right definition of privacy for it to hold ground against the right to record).
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government-compiled data—in this case, individuals’ criminal records—went against the “practical obscurity” or anonymity-throughobscurity of uncollated data.84 The Court emphasized that “the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy
interest implicated by disclosure of that information.”85 Finally, the
Court focused on the importance of “the privacy interest in keeping
personal facts away from the public eye.”86 Though unclear from
what constitutional source this privacy interest arises, the Court indicated that anonymity within uncompiled data may also be relevant
as a corollary to privacy rights, at least with respect to government
databases.87
To summarize, collecting and disseminating information are activities protected by the First Amendment. In cases where collection
and dissemination does not take place in the public sphere, governmental interests, statutes, and others’ rights might hinder First
Amendment rights to collect and disseminate information. Even if
individuals can collect and disseminate information, collating information from different sources, though likely allowed by the First
Amendment, might violate privacy rights and destroy data subjects’
anonymity-through-obscurity.88
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489 U.S. 749, 761–62 (1989).
Id. at 764.
86
Id. at 769.
87
An alternative approach that also conceptualizes how compiled data is greater than
the sum of its parts can be found in a torts approach against data surveillance operations,
in order to enforce seclusion (i.e., a watered-down form of anonymity). See Zhu, supra
note 35, at 2402 (noting that the true privacy threat of data surveillance occurs at the
information gathering stage because it is the first step in processing data, which is “more
revealing than the sum of the ‘unprocessed’ data”). One problem with the tort approach is
that it requires that if personal information were not voluntarily disclosed, then that
information is private and subject to a possible privacy tort. Id. at 2408. But faces are
personal information and are voluntarily disclosed, if only by a subject’s presence in the
public sphere. Thus, the basis for a privacy tort seems much weaker as applied to FRT.
88
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory,
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1755–56, 1756 n.182 (2014)
(discussing how the combination of the NSA’s metadata collection and data from other
sources can easily destroy an individual’s anonymity).
85
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C. Fourth Amendment Cases
While First Amendment doctrine occasionally touches upon the
right to anonymous speech, the Fourth Amendment has far more to
say about anonymity broadly. The Fourth Amendment prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”89 In line with the discussion
of anonymous speech under the First Amendment, unreasonable
searches of a person could undermine their anonymity. A variety of
Fourth Amendment cases focus on the intersection between the First
and Fourth Amendments, surveillance, national security, chilled
speech, and data. A combination of the First and Fourth Amendments’ protections could regulate governmental activity, though exactly how that plays out is unclear.90 Generally, three trends emerge.
First, when a third-party collects information about an individual
and subsequently gives that information to the government—commonly known as the third party doctrine—such sharing of private
information with the government can chill speech, which undermines First and Fourth Amendment principles. Second, where
speech is chilled, plaintiffs have a hard time attaining standing. Finally, in cases with cell phones, traditional third-party and chilled
speech doctrines may be inapplicable given Carpenter v. United
States.
First, in United States v. United States District Court (hereinafter “Keith”), the Court considered whether the government should
be required to disclose the information that it gathered through warrantless surveillance of suspected terrorists.91 The Court noted that
national security cases “reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values” that are not always present in cases of ordinary
crime.92 The Court held that the government must disclose the information, stating that “Fourth Amendment protections become . . .
necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute . . . .”93
89

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
For a detailed discussion of the intersection of the First and Fourth Amendments, see
Strandburg, supra note 8, at 795–96.
91
407 U.S. 297, 297–302 (1972).
92
Id. at 313.
93
Id. at 314.
90
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But lower courts have mainly applied Keith through the lens of
analyzing how overbroad Fourth Amendment searches generally
chill speech, rather than evaluating how the searches deter anonymity or anonymous speech. For example, the D.C. Circuit noted that
the First Amendment “does not guarantee journalists the right to preserve the secrecy of their sources in the face of [g]ood faith criminal
investigation . . .[g]overnment inspection of third-party records,
while it may inhibit . . . news-gathering activity, does not impermissibly abridge such activity” when the government’s investigation
takes place in accordance with Fourth Amendment law.94 Thus, the
government could collect de-anonymizing or identifying information through a third-party where a good faith investigation exists.
However, some circuits have moved in the other direction, using the
chilling effects on speech to expand the Fourth Amendment’s protections. The Ninth Circuit noted that where a subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a non-public space, like a mosque, the
collection of private conversations is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation test.95 The D.C. Circuit also noted
that Fourth Amendment surveillance could lead to the government
seizing innocent citizens’ conversations96 or chill the speech of
those opposed to government policies.97 Although these protections
are positive, little discussion of anonymity exists in these cases.98
They do not explicitly discuss whether collecting or disclosing identifying information is the underlying reason for potential chilled
speech.
Even if the chilling effects argument under the First and Fourth
Amendments is salient, standing issues arise where chilling effects
are concerned. In Whalen v. Roe, the Court once again considered a
prescription drug disclosure and recordkeeping statute.99 The Court
94

Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1053 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
95
Fazaga v. FBI, 965 F.3d 1015, 1037 (9th Cir. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 142 S.
Ct. 1051 (2021).
96
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 634–35 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
97
Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 12 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
98
See supra notes 95–97.
99
429 U.S. 589, 591–92 (1977). It turns out that prescription drug disclosure issues are
highly litigated—as the Sackler Family is learning, all too late. See Meryl Kornfield, Judge
Overturns Deal Giving Purdue Pharma’s Sackler Family Civil Immunity From Opioid

650

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:630

upheld the statute as constitutional, specifically noting, “[t]he patient-identification requirement was a reasonable exercise of the
[state’s] broad police powers” under the Fourth Amendment.100 Further, the Court referenced the First Amendment, stating that its associational principles were not strong enough to prevent the government from enacting such a regulation101 and that the impacts on freedom of association were too speculative.102 Further, in California
Bankers Association v. Shultz, the Court considered whether a statute requiring banks to maintain records of consumers’ identities and
deposits was constitutional under the Fourth and First Amendments.103 Because banks already kept such records, and because
they were not compelled to give the records up, the statute did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.104 Further, the Court ruled that reporting requirements for transactions involving domestic individuals did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the bank owned
the records, not the individuals themselves.105 Finally, the Court did
not determine whether the statute violated First Amendment associational rights of certain petitioners because the claim was hypothetical.106 In sum, two principles stand out. First, unless the government
compels a third-party to give up records of an individual, no Fourth
Amendment claim stands. Second, chilling effects to the First
Amendment’s associational aspects require tangible standing.
All this jurisprudence may be bucked by Carpenter v. United
States, where the Court made a cautious ruling requiring the government to obtain a warrant to collect cell site location data produced
by cell phones and stored in cell service providers’ databases.107
While the case had little to do with the First Amendment, it is notable as one of few cases where the Court adequately confronted the
nature of cell phone data. The Court noted that cell phone records
Claims, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2021, 11:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2021/12/16/purdue-pharma-sackler-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/V47D-TL5G].
100
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
101 Id. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 600–02.
103 416 U.S. 21, 25–28 (1974)
104 Id. at 51–54.
105
Id. at 66.
106 Id. at 75–76.
107
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
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are unique and reveal incredibly private and detailed information.108
Thus, the Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine does not apply
to this “qualitatively different” data.109 Alluding to issues of anonymity, the Court noted that “[a] person does not surrender all
Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.
To the contrary, ‘what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.’”110
Similarly, in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence implied that data aggregation through surveillance may impact
First Amendment associational rights.111 She asserted that GPS
monitoring creates a precise record “of a person’s public movements
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”112 Taken together, Carpenter and Jones may provide an avenue to argue that a broad-based
government data collection program collects “qualitatively different” data that could unmask an individual’s identity and therefore
affect First Amendment associational rights. But this is a novel argument, and not one completely substantiated by extant cases.
At this interesting intersection between the First and Fourth
Amendment, the chilling of speech through surveillance is a real
concern and one the Court has addressed. While the underlying principles of the Amendments intersect in some fashion, applying First
and Fourth Amendment principles directly to surveillance technology may yield different results compared to applying just the First
Amendment. This is primarily due to the heightened scrutiny required for the government to interfere with First Amendment rights,
culminating in the need to demonstrate heightened interest and narrow tailoring of the policy (in this case, surveillance). The Fourth
Amendment has a lower threshold for permitting government action, allowing for overbroad data collection and non-minimally-invasive surveillance techniques.113 A successful argument under the
108

Id. at 2216–19.
Id.
110 Id. at 2217 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)).
111 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
112 Id.
113
See Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment to Do the Work of the First?,
127 YALE L.J. F. 444, 455–56 (2017), for a brief analysis on the First and Fourth
Amendments’ applicability to surveillance technologies.
109
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nexus of the First and Fourth Amendments may posit that collection
of publicly-available data is a seizure under Carpenter, but is not
just subject to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirements. Instead, if a surveillance policy either chills speech or discloses the identity of the speaker to the government, the First
Amendment’s heightened scrutiny standards also apply. Thus, the
critical issue of collecting/monitoring can be tackled using the
Fourth Amendment, and the issue of chilling speech can be tackled
using the First Amendment. However, this theory remains untested
in the courts.
Even with such novel nexus theories, there are hurdles to bring
such a claim: the need for non-speculative harm, national security
concerns, and private speakers’ own First Amendment rights.
II. FACIAL RECOGNITION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The doctrinal outline provided in Part I may be entertaining on
an exam or in a doctrinal constitutional law course, but it does not
tell the whole story. As applied to FRT, the First Amendment right
to anonymous speech has complex and unfortunate consequences.
To understand these implications, this Part first describes FRT and
how it works. It then assesses First Amendment implications of the
government and private companies’ use of FRT. Finally, this Part
briefly evaluates Fourth Amendment implications.
A. What Is Facial Recognition and How Is It Used?
While facial recognition has only recently become a technological reality, the basic concept has been around since the 1960s, when
Batman used the “batphotoscope” to label a villain’s secret identity.114 Today, Apple’s iPhone is a popular example of a personal
device using FRT. Apple launched the iPhone X with “Face ID”
technology, which uses a variety of sensors and cameras to create a
three-dimensional mask of the user’s face.115 The mask (also called

114

Batman: The Clock King’s Crazy Crimes (ABC television broadcast Oct. 12, 1966).
See Rachel Metz, Facial Recognition Is Only the Beginning: Here’s What to Expect
Next in Biometrics on Your Phone, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/09/20/4026/facial-recognition-is-only-the-
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a mapping or model) is unique to each user, with a low probability
that an imposter could deceive the technology.116 On an individual
user’s device, the purpose is innocent: unlocking the device or authenticating the user’s identity to activate a credit card or access a
password.117 The FRT detects a person’s face and compares it
against a preexisting map to determine whether it is the face of the
person preauthorized to unlock the phone.118
However, when such technology is scaled to monitor public
spaces and the faces of the public at large, the power and potential
threat of FRT becomes more evident.119 This expansion is not just
in scope, but also in kind. Unlike the detection and analysis system
on an iPhone, facial recognition systems are used to detect and recognize individuals by using many cameras or a variety of data
sources.120 This can implicate privacy issues in public spaces since,
by identifying a person’s presence at a certain location, these systems can track individuals’ movements and locations.121 These systems generally compare captured images to existing photos in a database (often called a facial recognition database) that have been
collected through photo shots, web searches, mugshots, prior surveillance camera footage, and other sources, in order to identify a
person.122

beginning-heres-what-to-expect-next-in-biometrics-on-your/
[https://perma.cc/F4994YPH] (describing Apple’s Face ID technology).
116
Id.
117 See
generally About Face ID Advanced Technology, APPLE, https://
support.apple.com/en-us/HT208108 [https://perma.cc/J7WS-TLDN] (describing the uses
of Face ID).
118 Thorin Klosowski, Facial Recognition Is Everywhere. Here’s What We Can Do About
It, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/how-facialrecognition-works/ [https://perma.cc/8WQN-FHWZ].
119
Batman, once again, is a great visual guide, this time in Christopher Nolan’s iteration.
In The Dark Knight, Batman uses a not-quite-facial-recognition system which spies on cell
phone users through their microphones and cameras (which is, in some sense, more
invasive than static facial recognition). THE DARK KNIGHT (Warner Brothers Pictures,
2008).
120 See Face Recognition, E
LEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.eff.org/
pages/face-recognition [https://perma.cc/J9H9-QVRJ].
121
Klosowski, supra note 118.
122 See Karen Hao, This Is How We Lost Control of Our Faces, MIT T
ECH. REV. (Feb. 5,
2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/05/1017388/ai-deep-learning-facial-
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Using algorithms and deep learning,123 these systems can go beyond simply identifying a person, determining a subject’s personality, ethnicity, and other intimate traits and characteristics.124 This
creates two categories of consequences. First, the systems’ ability to
compare faces to those in an existing database could constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Second, the identification of
an individual’s behavioral and other intimate traits challenges a person’s subjective expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.125 Undermining this expectation of privacy could chill that
person from appearing in public spaces for fear of having their anonymity destroyed, which also implicates that person’s ability to
speak anonymously in public and their relevant First Amendment
right to anonymous speech.
Beyond these speculative legal risks, there are real issues with
existing facial recognition systems (as opposed to FRT on individual
devices). Such systems are not always accurate, especially when
identifying non-white subjects.126 This is likely due to the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of certain races in the databases
upon which systems rely to train and deploy algorithms.127 For example, Black people are disproportionately represented in mugshot
databases and, as such, may be more quickly labelled criminals by
an FRT system.128 Further, these systems can go beyond simply
identifying an individual, by making predictive determinations
recognition-data-history/ [https://perma.cc/D6UD-7YSE] (describing how facial
recognition systems have evolved).
123 Deep learning is a type of machine learning (which is learning based on training
algorithms using data sets) that is structured similarly to a neural network and allows the
system to discover representations that are needed to detect features or classify data. See
Juergen Schmidhuber, Deep Learning in Neural Networks: An Overview, 61 NEURAL
NETWORKS 85, 86 (2015).
124 See Hao, supra note 122.
125
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
126 Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
9,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-raceartificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/KKM8-CCWN].
127 Id.; see also Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional
Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING
RSCH. 1, 1 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CG2Z-56RP] (describing how machine learning algorithms discriminate
based on classes like race and gender).
128
See Lohr, supra note 126.
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about a subject’s identity, sexuality, IQ, or political leaning.129 Finally, how data is collected and whether it was used consensually
implicates questions of privacy and notice, among other issues.130
Despite these concerns, facial recognition databases are ubiquitous. As of 2016, more than 117 million Americans’ faces were in a
law enforcement facial recognition database.131 Facebook, which
has more than 2.8 billion users,132 has amassed the largest facial dataset to date.133 Both the government and private companies’ use of
the technology is worrisome, though the former raises stronger First
and Fourth Amendment concerns. The government’s use of facial
recognition includes police and law enforcement. As of 2016, at
least twenty-five states, including a variety of state and local law
enforcement agencies, used facial recognition databases.134 This includes local law enforcement’s access to facial recognition databases, as well as to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”)
database and access to local law enforcement’s databases.135 In
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Jamie Condliffe, Facial Recognition Is Getting Incredibly Powerful—and Ever More
Controversial, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/
2017/09/08/149250/facial-recognition-is-getting-incredibly-powerful-and-ever-morecontroversial/ [https://perma.cc/3MUY-STWH]; see generally Michal Kosinski & Yilun
Wang, Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate Than Humans at Detecting Sexual
Orientation From Facial Images, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 246 (Feb. 2018)
(describing the ability for such systems to determine sexuality based on one image).
130
See Klosowski, supra note 118. Note that the list of issues with facial recognition
systems goes beyond the three listed here, but for the purposes of this Article, these are the
three most relevant issues.
131 Clare Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in
America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://
www.perpetuallineup.org/ [https://perma.cc/PRG3-8FAR].
132 Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 2nd Quarter 2021,
STATISTA (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthlyactive-facebook-users-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/L4V3-CL27].
133
April Glaser, Facebook’s Face-ID Database Could Be the Biggest in the World. Yes,
It Should Worry Us., SLATE (July 9, 2019, 7:20 PM), https://slate.com/technology/
2019/07/facebook-facial-recognition-ice-bad.html [https://perma.cc/5FA4-3E76].
134 The full list of states includes Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington D.C. See Garvie et al., supra note 131. Of course,
Florida’s inclusion on this list is the least surprising. See The Daily Show with Jon Stewart:
Florida Haters (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 13, 2015).
135
See Garvie et al., supra note 131.
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addition, police not only use facial datasets from government databases, but also images amassed from social media.136
In addition to databases, a variety of airports, transit systems,
and police forces have active camera systems that capture individuals’ faces, which can subsequently be compared to those already in
a facial recognition database.137 Both Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) and the FBI use facial recognition systems;
the former at the border and airports,138 and the latter across the
country.139 Reacting to both the local and federal government’s use
of facial recognition databases and systems, cities like San Francisco
and Oakland, California, and Somerville, Massachusetts banned local law enforcement from using facial recognition.140 Advocacy
groups are also bringing suits against federal agencies.141
Beyond the government, private companies use facial recognition systems and datasets. Their possession and use of these systems
is concerning because of the potential privacy violations of nonconsenting individuals, as well as the government’s potential access to
136

See James Vincent, NYPD Used Facial Recognition to Track Down Black Lives
Matter Activist, VERGE (Aug. 18, 2020, 5:26 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/
18/21373316/nypd-facial-recognition-black-lives-matter-activist-derrick-ingram
[https://perma.cc/5CST-D9XT] (reporting that the NYPD may have used social media
photographs to investigate a Black Lives Matter activist, without having an active search
warrant).
137
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See
Ban
Facial
Recognition,
FIGHT
FUTURE,
https://
www.banfacialrecognition.com/map/ [https://perma.cc/4XJN-XYER] (showing a variety
of state and local law enforcement agencies and transit authorities that use facial
recognition).
138 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,216 (Mar. 9, 2017) (calling for the
“expedite[d] . . . completion and implementation of a biometric entry-exit tracking system
for in-scope travelers to the United States”).
139
Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos Are a Gold Mine for
Facial-Recognition
Searches,
WASH.
POST
(July
7,
2019),
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-licensephotos-are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/ [https://perma.cc/685H-ZYS3].
140
Shirin Ghaffary & Rani Molla, Here’s Where the US Government Is Using Facial
Recognition Technology to Surveil Americans, VOX (Dec. 10, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/7/18/20698307/facial-recognition-technology-usgovernment-fight-for-the-future [https://perma.cc/C8NW-UQJV]; see also Ban Facial
Recognition, supra note 137 (providing an updated list of cities banning the technology).
141
See, e.g., Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Customs & Border Prot., 248 F. Supp. 3d 12 (D.D.C.
2017) (granting summary judgment for petitioners regarding a Freedom of Information Act
request regarding respondent’s facial recognition systems).
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such data and systems. For example, Facebook’s facial recognition
feature was142 consumer-facing; although it made the feature opt-in
due to privacy and related litigation concerns.143 Further, the company agreed to obtain “affirmative express consent” before using facial recognition beyond the permission granted in a user’s privacy
settings.144 But, while Facebook did not allow third parties to access
its facial database,145 the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”)
Prism program did collect information from companies like Google
and Facebook,146 though it is unclear whether they ever accessed
facial data.
Other private companies like Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft sell
commercial facial recognition systems and software.147 All three
companies have expressed concerns or issued moratoria about selling such technology to the government.148 Vendors of facial recognition systems that have not expressed such qualms include 3M,
Cognitec, DataWorks Plus, Dynamic Imaging Systems, FaceFirst,
142

In late 2021, Facebook announced that it would shut down its facial recognition
system and its underlying data. But the company retains the algorithm and software
(DeepFace), which is incredibly accurate because it has been trained on the billions of
photographs that Facebook used when the facial recognition system was in operation.
Kashmir Hill & Ryan Mac, Facebook, Citing Societal Concerns, Plans to Shut Down
Facial Recognition System, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/11/02/technology/facebook-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/85TA-Q4PX].
143 See generally In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (certifying a class action lawsuit regarding Facebook’s use of FRT as a violation of
an Illinois biometric privacy law), aff’d, Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir.
2019); see also Facebook Settles Facial Recognition Dispute, BBC (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51309186
[https://perma.cc/ZQ5N-QWY8]
(describing the origins of Facebook’s facial recognition software and subsequent lawsuits).
144 Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep
Privacy Promises, FTC (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep
[https://perma.cc/NS9Y-M3H7].
145
See Glaser, supra note 133.
146 Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps Into User Data of
Apple, Google, and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
[https://perma.cc/V75F-37BQ].
147 Pam Greenberg, Spotlight | Facial Recognition Gaining Measured Acceptance, N
AT’ L
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/facial-recognition-gaining-measuredacceptance-magazine2020.aspx [https://perma.cc/85NW-A6J5].
148
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and NEC Global.149 Finally, Clearview AI is the most relevant and
has amassed more than three billion facial images by scraping the
internet, including sites like Facebook, YouTube, and Venmo.150
The company has sold its facial recognition software to more than
six-hundred police departments throughout the United States and
Canada.151
While the use of FRT in these contexts raises many concerns—
including privacy, contractual, and ethical concerns—for the purposes of this Article, two issues are pertinent. First, whether such
technologies in the hands of (1) the government and (2) private actors implicate the First Amendment right to anonymous speech. Second, whether they implicate Fourth Amendment issues that could,
in turn, raise First Amendment issues.
B. First Amendment Implications
A variety of First Amendment issues could arise from the use of
FRT. First, when the government uses such systems, it has the potential to chill speech and de-anonymize speakers. However, because the government’s use of FRT does not require registration
prior to speech like that of McIntyre, and since the right to anonymous speech is viewed through the disclosure approach, legal hurdles arise. Second, private companies’ First Amendment rights
might invalidate anonymous speech claims and their interactions
with the government fall in a legally ambiguous zone.
1. The Government’s Use of Facial Recognition
The government’s use of FRT may raise First Amendment issues because its collection of individuals’ faces and therefore whereabouts may deter people from speaking in the public sphere, protesting, and engaging in protected expressive activity, which would
chill anonymous speech. Unfortunately, an individual’s face and facial expressions are not considered protected speech by the Court.
The Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is possible to find some kernel

149

Face Recognition, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.eff.org/
pages/face-recognition [https://perma.cc/7CVR-8658].
150 See Hill, supra note 5.
151
Id.
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of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity
within the protection of the First Amendment.”152 Instead, whether
speech is protected by the First Amendment depends on the “expressive content” it conveys.153 And, the extent to which the government’s use of FRT burdens expressive speech protected by the First
Amendment “depends on the likelihood that legitimate expressive
associations will be exposed to government scrutiny.”154 Here, since
only subjects’ faces are being exposed to government scrutiny, no
underlying speech is directly being captured, since the images captured by FRT are unlikely to be considered expressive, and thus the
underlying facial expressions are unprotected by the First Amendment.155
Instead, the government’s collection of images of individuals’
faces implicates different First Amendment concerns centering
around the chilling effect on speech rather than the right to anonymous speech directly. This is because FRT does not require an individual to disclose who is speaking or producing political literature—
unlike the issues considered in McIntyre, Bartnicki, and Watchtower
Bible—since individuals here are not directly producing speech and
registering their speech with the government.156 Nor are the general
principles of these cases implicated. For example, no individual is
publishing leaflets, and so the freedom to publish is not implicated.157 Nor is a private conversation being disclosed publicly.158
Nor are individuals advocating for unpopular causes.159 Instead, a
government-run FRT is simply collecting publicly available data by
152

City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572–73
(1995).
154
Strandburg, supra note 8, at 803 (emphasis added).
155 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 253 (2002) (referencing Stanglin
and noting that government’s inhibition “of association is generally not a violation of the
First Amendment unless the group is engaged in some type of speech activity.”).
156 See supra Part I.A.
157 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
158
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–34 (2001).
159 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167
(2002).
153
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collecting images of people in public. Thus, it is unlikely that the
right to anonymous speech is implicated, at least through the disclosure approach.
Rather, the government’s capture of individuals’ faces creates a
chilling effect on speech, including anonymous speech made in the
public square.160 Such usage of FRT can distort speech, reinforce
behavior,161 influence the beliefs of those whose beliefs are undecided, increase anxiety and unease, create cognitive dissonance and
self-censorship, and generally weaken minority influence.162 Despite these commonly-accepted impacts on speech, chilling effect
arguments have found little traction in post-9/11 government surveillance cases.163 Further, the Court generally does not find this argument enticing. For example, in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, petitioners argued that the New
York Bar’s character and fitness screening process violated the First
Amendment by chilling speech.164 The Court was unconvinced,
holding that respondents showed “every willingness to keep their
investigations within constitutionally permissible limits.”165 Further, the Court emphasized that the chilling effect argument was an
inappropriate policy argument for the Court to adjudicate.166 Similarly, the Court has ignored arguments that overly punitive laws chill
speech,167 and that chilling effects to speech are a strong enough
consideration to prohibit state action.168
Where the Court has struck down statutes because of chilling
effects, the bar for showing that a policy or law chills speech is high.
In Reno v. ACLU, respondents challenged the Communications Decency Act’s (“CDA”) provisions that proscribed the “knowing

160

See Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 9, at 485–93 (describing the effects of
surveillance). Specifically, surveillance and the threat of surveillance can cause an
individual to conform to a group’s behavior or beliefs and can more broadly change a
subject’s behavior. Id. at 492.
161
Id. at 483.
162 Id. at 499–500.
163 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 T
EX. L. REV. 387, 433 (2008).
164 401 U.S. 154, 156–59 (1971).
165 Id. at 167.
166
Id.
167 Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 59 (1989).
168
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971).
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transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under
[eighteen] years of age.”169 The Court struck down these provisions,
identifying the CDA as a content-based regulation and finding it sufficiently vague as to deter speech, “silenc[ing] some speakers whose
messages would be entitled to constitutional protection.”170 Similarly, in Dombrowski v. Pfister, the Court struck down parts of Louisiana’s Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law because
the arrests and prosecutions of the petitioners were proof that the
law chilled speech.171 The Court concluded that “[t]he chilling effect
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the
fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or
failure.”172
Thus, a case against the government’s use of FRT would have
to show that any FRT system is statutorily overbroad or leads to arrests and prosecutions of individuals in a manner that chills speech.
Showing this will be difficult. Government policies that permit government agencies to use FRT do not directly regulate content and
are generally not unconstitutionally vague, because most policies
are implemented through administrative decisions rather than
through statutes like the CDA.173 Further, a wide variety of these
FRT systems are used to track down and capture individuals who
had already committed crimes,174 which helps provide evidence for
successful prosecutions. Unlike in Dombrowski, where the statute
169

521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997). For a retrospectively entertaining read and the Court’s
description of the internet and the presence of sexually explicit material on the internet, see
id. at 849–55.
170 Id. at 872–74.
171 380 U.S. 479, 487, 498 (1965).
172 Id.
173
See, e.g., NGI System of Records Notice, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,284 (May 5, 2016)
(documenting the creation of the Next Generation Identification system and detailing,
among other things, an “interstate photo system” and “the addition of face recognition
technology to permit law enforcement to search photos against the interstate photo
system”); 84 Fed. Reg. 54,182 (Oct. 9, 2019) (proposing the use of iris images and
fingerprints to the FBI’s Next Generation Identification system).
174 See, e.g., Ryan Lucas, How a Tip—and Facial Recognition Technology—Helped the
FBI Catch a Killer, NPR (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/
08/21/752484720/how-a-tip-and-facial-recognition-technology-helped-the-fbi-catch-akiller [https://perma.cc/C3J9-J7LW] (showing that the FBI compared a photograph
provided by a tipster against the FBI’s database of facial images to track a most wanted
fugitive).
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threatened to prosecute people because of their speech, FRT systems
simply substantiate that someone has already committed a crime. In
effect, the government’s use of FRT systems simply facilitates the
government’s general crime-control function.175 Without allegations that the government’s use of FRT goes beyond “constitutionally permissible limits,”176 the use of FRT appears to fit within the
confines of justified self-regulated behavior like in Wadmond, even
if it could be considered overly punitive.
Ultimately, case law and history do not provide a good avenue
for challenging the government’s use of FRTs under the First
Amendment. The problem only intensifies when looking at private
actors’ use of the technology.
2. Private Actors’ Use of Facial Recognition
While an exhaustive discussion of private actors’ use of FRT is
beyond the scope of this Article, this Article discusses two major
issues with respect to private actors. First, private actors’ own First
Amendment rights indicate that they may be able to use facial recognition systems without significant constraints. Second, private actors who partner with the government may also not be regulatable,
allowing the government a means to circumvent the First Amendment.
Private actors use facial recognition for a variety of purposes:
preventing theft at retail stores,177 micro-targeting sales to

175

The Court frequently favors crime control, even when it slightly impacts the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57–63 (1973)
(upholding a Georgia court’s decision to prevent the screening of two hardcore
pornographic films because the state’s proper concern with safeguarding crime and other
effects of obscene materials was a legitimate interest that satisfied the Court’s ambiguous
level of scrutiny).
176 Law Students C.R. Rsch. Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 167 (1971).
177 See, e.g., Leticia Miranda, Thousands of Stores Will Soon Use Facial Recognition,
and They Won’t Need Your Consent, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 17, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/leticiamiranda/retail-companies-are-testing-out-facialrecognition-at [https://perma.cc/G77M-WSBP] (describing the proliferation of facial
recognition to prevent shoplifting).
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customers,178 and monitoring employee behavior to improve
safety179 or performance,180 reduce security threats,181 or mitigate
COVID-19 exposures.182 How regulatable these technologies are
depends on the kinds of databases and underlying systems that exist.
For example, if the facial recognition system is a closed environment that simply tracks individuals who enter a LEGO Store183 and
maintains records of those behaving suspiciously, the system does
not implicate the First or Fourth Amendments since it operates
within the confines of a private environment.184
But if the LEGO Store surveillance system matches the faces it
tracks to those in an external database, the source of the data in the
external database has relevant implications. For example, if the external database’s data originates from social media or data profiles,
the origins of the data may implicate contract law and regulatory
scrutiny if user agreements from the source of the data (i.e., the
178

See, e.g., Daniel Thomas, The Cameras That Know if You’re Happy—Or a Threat,
BBC (July 17, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44799239 [https://perma.cc/
2GX8-JC2R] (“A supermarket might use it in the aisles, not to identify people, but to
analyse [sic] who came in in terms of age and gender as well as their basic mood. It can
help with targeted marketing and product placement.”).
179 Sara Castellanos, Chevron CIO Says Technology Triggers Faster Human Decisions,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chevron-cio-says-technologytriggers-faster-human-decisions-11548808058 [https://perma.cc/J9QE-ZAS3].
180 See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Managers Turn to Surveillance Software, Always-on
Webcams to Ensure Employees Are (Really) Working from Home, WASH. POST (Apr. 30,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/30/work-from-homesurveillance/ [https://perma.cc/A3W6-3UT5] (discussing the use of webcams and a
potential facial recognition feature).
181 See, e.g., Mike Rogoway, Intel Starts Using Facial Recognition Technology to ID
Workers, Visitors, OREGONIAN, https://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-forest/2020/03/intelstarts-using-facial-recognition-technology-to-scan-workers-visitors.html
[https://perma.cc/HS8P-9YVB] (Mar. 11, 2020, 6:16 AM) (“Computers analyze those
[facial] images to identify these people, part of a broad program Intel says will help identify
‘high risk individuals’ who might pose a threat to the chipmaker or its workers.”).
182 See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Employers Rush to Adopt Virus Screening. The Tools May
Not Help Much, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
05/11/technology/coronavirus-worker-testing-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/DAN2F66X] (describing the use of a fever-detection and facial recognition camera service known
as PopID to identify workers and gauge their temperature).
183 In the Author’s opinion, one of the best store franchises offered in the United States.
184
But see Slobogin, supra note 155, at 256 (noting that where employers use
photography and surveillance to track employees who have been involved in strikes, the
Court has been willing to find a chilling effect on speech, at least in the labor context).
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origin social media website) were abused. For example, Facebook’s
nonconsensual disclosure of users’ phone numbers to third parties
led to the FTC imposing a fine and mandatory privacy regime on the
company.185 However, where a middleman creates the database by
scraping data from the internet, the middleman company’s First
Amendment rights may permit it to collect the data. This is the argument Clearview AI has put forth in pending litigation, though the
matter is far from finished.186 Notably, what is missing from the discussion is the right to anonymous speech, since no actor—the LEGO
store, middlemen like Clearview AI, or social media companies—is
chilling anonymous speech as was intended in the Court’s relevant
case law dealing with public speech and disclosure of a speaker’s
identity to the government.187
Of course, the mechanics of this system might implicate the First
Amendment—if the Court deems social media platforms and the internet as public forums. The state of this issue is currently in flux,
both because technology moves rapidly188 and because the Court is
reluctant to make broad decisions in the internet context.189 And
where the Court has spoken, the waters are muddy. For example, in
Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court struck down a statute preventing sex offenders from using social media websites.190 The
Court noted that social media was a principle source “for knowing
current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening
in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast

185

In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., C-4365, 2020 FTC LEXIS 80 (F.T.C. Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/c4365facebookmodifyingorder.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9TL-2BZF].
186 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020 CH 04353
(Ill. Cir. Ct. 2021), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2020.10.07_
memo_of_law_iso_mtd.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MYN-SBC2].
187
See supra Part I.A.
188 As Mark Zuckerberg may have said, technology clearly breaks things (like our
democracy). See, e.g., Hemant Taneja, The Era of “Move Fast and Break Things” Is Over,
HARVARD BUS. REV. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-era-of-move-fast-andbreak-things-is-over [https://perma.cc/UX72-25J9]; Randall Munroe, Move Fast and
Break Things, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/1428/ [https://perma.cc/UJA5-76XE].
189 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (where the Court
cabins its decision about requiring warrants for cell site location information (“CSLI”) only
to CSLI, rather than renovating all third party doctrine).
190
137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
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realms of human thought and knowledge.”191 But this slight statement does not indicate whether public forum doctrine applies to all
social media or whether the public square was being used metaphorically. Some indication can be found in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, where the Second Circuit
deemed a government official’s Twitter account a public forum.192
While the case was vacated as moot, Justice Thomas advocated for
social media platforms to be considered public forums based on the
power held by these companies.193 All this is to say that if social
media sites are considered public forums, then the discussion and
First Amendment implications surrounding data scraping and anonymous speech might differ. But this is not currently the case.
A final issue is that private actors share information and technology with the government. Those whose speech is chilled by the
government’s acquisition of such data are at a disadvantage. The
government already acquires data from private companies, especially regarding border issues.194 There are two issues that apply,
likely rooted in the Fourth Amendment. First, the Stored Communications Act likely prevents the digital platforms where data originates (e.g., Facebook, Google, Twitter) from sharing the data directly with the government without a subpoena or warrant.195 But a
middleman, such as Clearview AI, is not prohibited from doing
so.196 Such middlemen are allowed to scrape publicly available data
from Facebook and Google and share it with the government, as

191

Id.
928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated as moot, Biden v. Knight First Amend.
Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021).
193 Biden, 141 S. Ct. at 1227 (Thomas, J., concurring).
194
See, e.g., Bryan Tau & Michelle Hackman, Federal Agencies Use Cellphone Location
Data for Immigration Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2020, 7:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-agencies-use-cellphone-location-data-forimmigration-enforcement-11581078600 [https://perma.cc/8P53-JQ4R] (reporting that ICE
bought millions of dollars of licenses to access location data for immigration enforcement
purposes); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (exemplifying
the U.S. government’s ability to access foreign consumer data).
195
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
196 Id. (the statute only applies to “a person or entity providing an electronic
communication service . . . .”) (emphasis added).
192
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Clearview AI currently does.197 Barring collusion between the government and private officials to censor speech,198 there are few limitations on selling and sharing data with the government. Second,
there are Fourth Amendment considerations, outlined in Part II.C.
Despite these (minimal) limitations, if history is any indicator,
the government seems to get its way, especially when issues of national security and crime are implicated. The Prism Program—
which collected information based on government demands to private companies199—has survived a variety of court challenges since
its inception.200 Similarly, the NSA’s bulk telephone metadata collection program stood for more than ten years before the Second
Circuit declared it unconstitutional.201 On a positive note, it is possible, through the collection/dissemination doctrine discussed
above, that the compilation of this data through various sources
might dissipate the anonymity that individual pieces of data might
have, which would then create a cognizable claim under reasoning
from Reporters Committee.202 Even so, the right to anonymity in
Reporters Committee was based on a statutory right, which is a
197

See, e.g., Gilad Edelman, Can the Government Buy Its Way Around the Fourth
Amendment?, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/can-government-buyway-around-fourth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/5KL9-DCNE] (noting that the Stored
Communications Act “probably doesn’t apply to a broker . . . that doesn’t deal with
consumers directly”).
198
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 72 (1963) (holding that a “scheme of
state censorship effectuated by extralegal sanctions” in cooperation with a private party is
unconstitutional).
199 Barton Gellman & Askan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoogoogle-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-416611e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html [https://perma.cc/Y59N-RV2U] (describing private
companies who were subject to this data sharing requirement).
200
See, e.g., Schuchardt v. Trump, No. 14-705, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17174 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 4, 2019), aff’d, Schuchardt v. President of U.S., 802 F. App’x 69 (3d Cir. 2020)
(dismissing a claim that plaintiff was affected by the Prism program because the plaintiff
did not show that his information was collected through the program); see also Wikimedia
Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 335 F. Supp. 3d 772, 790 (D. Md. 2018) (dismissing
plaintiff’s motions for discovery regarding data collected by the Prism program due to
procedural constraints and the state secrets doctrine).
201
ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 824 (2d Cir. 2015).
202 See generally U.S. Dep’t. of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Free Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989);
see also supra note 87 and accompanying discussion.
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complicated route to ensure the protection of anonymous speech
given the lack of any current statutes regulating FRT or creating a
right to anonymous speech.
Ultimately, from the perspective of current case law, not much
prevents private companies from scraping data and implementing
their own FRT systems. Recent history indicates that where the government buys this data, or collates it by pressuring companies, there
may be few means of recourse in preserving the right to anonymous
speech.
C. Fourth Amendment Implications and Inferences
FRT may also implicate the Fourth Amendment, whose penumbra might, in turn, impact the First Amendment right to anonymous
speech. This Section is an abridged discussion of relevant Fourth
Amendment principles implicated by FRT, and how they might invoke First Amendment principles.
Generally, FRT in the public sphere does not violate the Fourth
Amendment because “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public . . . is not [subject to] Fourth Amendment protection.”203 This
applies regardless of the type of technology employed to conduct
such surveillance.204 However, the granularity with which data provides information about a subject may limit what the government
can collect without a warrant. In Carpenter, the Court explicitly
noted the unique nature of cell site location information (“CSLI”)
data, stating that the granularity of such data gave the government
“perfect surveillance” abilities rather than general ones.205 CSLI
data could also enable the government to create a profile about an
individual’s whereabouts retrospectively and continuously, without
limitation.206 This shows the Court’s concern about technologies
203

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For a practical example, see Byron
Tau, License-Plate Scans Aid Crime-Solving but Spur Little Privacy Debate, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 10, 2021, 12:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/license-plate-scans-aid-crimesolving-but-spur-little-privacy-debate-11615384816
[https://perma.cc/WHU9-XZF7]
(discussing the widespread use of license plate scanners to track insurrectionists after
January 6th, in addition to other crime-fighting purposes).
204 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (applying Katz to an electronic
device used to track an individual for more than 100 miles).
205 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
206
Id.
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that allow the government to create such warrantless profiles of individuals’ whereabouts with a high level of precision and accuracy,
precisely like FRT.
Despite the professed protection for such revealing data, the
government could circumvent the warrant requirement from Carpenter by simply buying data (rather than subpoenaing it, as in Carpenter) from a third-party that collected the data.207 And there are
limited protections for data given to third parties, as the Court noted
in Smith v. Maryland.208 There, the Court found that the government’s use of a pen register209 to collect the phone numbers dialed
by petitioner did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the dialed numbers were being transmitted to a third party, and so the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this noncontent data.210
Three inferences can be drawn from the Fourth Amendment’s
public exposure doctrine, Carpenter, and third party doctrine. First,
preserving autonomy—which is central to the Fourth Amendment—
might depend on being identified in a large mass of people, rather
than remaining totally anonymous in public.211 Taking a cue from
this Fourth Amendment doctrine, this leads to possible solutions in
preserving the First Amendment right to anonymous speech, which
might have to focus on ensuring some threshold level of fungibility
among other members of the public rather than total anonymity.
Second, where personal data is transferred to third parties from
whom the government subsequently accesses that data, it may not
be protected under the third party doctrine.212 Finally, despite tomes
of doctrine, with Carpenter, the Court has shown that it is open to
changing direction when dealing with technological advancements

207

See Edelman, supra note 197.
442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
209 Id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In the olden days when phones had cords and
buttons, a pen register was used to collect the numbers that were dialed on a phone. Id. at
736 n.1. We would probably call this “metadata” collection now.
210 Id. at 745.
211
See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 UNIV. CHI. L. REV.
47, 81–82 (1974).
212
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
208
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that are qualitatively and quantitatively different from analogous
historical technologies.
One final observation is that the penumbras of the First and
Fourth Amendments may together create a cause of action for finding that FRT violates privacy rights. The penumbra theory intersects
with the right to anonymity, especially in terms of freedom of
thought, belief, and personhood.213 However, an exploration of the
penumbra theory is beyond the scope of this Article.
III. CHALLENGES TO LITIGATING AGAINST FRT UNDER THE RIGHT
TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Despite the challenges presented by extant case law and barriers
of the First and Fourth Amendments, potential plaintiffs may still
want to challenge the government’s use of FRT through litigation
under the right to anonymous speech. Such litigation would face an
uphill battle on three fronts: (1) finding plaintiffs who could meet
standing requirements; (2) overcoming national security issues; and
(3) defeating the right of private third parties to collect and receive
information.
A. Issues of Standing
A party must be “entitled to have the court decide the merits of
the dispute or of particular issues” for it to have standing before a
court.214 Here, there are three main issues with attaining standing.
First, the Court’s bar for the kind of injury that constitutes a particularized and legally-cognizable harm has narrowed in recent years;
combined with Twombly and Iqbal, the threshold is difficult to overcome. Second, regardless of whether a party can articulate a concrete harm, finding the right plaintiff is difficult. And even if these
213

See Slobogin, supra note 155, at 258–67 (discussing the penumbra theory and
additional implications to freedom of movement and repose, posed by surveillance
cameras). For an extended discussion about the right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment and how that intersects with the right to anonymity (as opposed to the specific
right to anonymous speech), see Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of
Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691, 715–20, 725–31 (2015).
214
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). For a broader discussion about standing
requirements, see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES, ch. 2, § 2.5 (2019).
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two hurdles are overcome, understanding whether collected information was used for infringing purposes presents additional difficulties. Taken together, these issues mean that even though the right
to anonymous speech exists in theory, it may be less applicable in
practice as applied to FRT.
Standing for chilling effects and anonymous speech is difficult
to attain. For example, in Laird v. Tatum, respondents challenged
the U.S. Army’s surveillance of civilians, alleging that it caused a
chilling effect on citizens’ First Amendment rights.215 The Army’s
surveillance program was intended to “quell insurrection and other
domestic violence,” and collected “information about public activities that were thought to have at least some potential for civil disorder.”216 Rejecting the argument on standing grounds, the Court said
that respondents did not show that they “sustained, or [were] immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result” of the
government’s program,217 and instead were inadequate “[a]llegations of a subjective chill.”218 The Court then went further in Clapper v. Amnesty International.219 It rejected respondent’s claim that
the fear of surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act caused respondents to take “costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications.”220 The Court said that subjective chill through the existence
of a surveillance program is not an adequate substitute for specific
subjective harm or threat of future harm.221 Instead, the injury must
be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling” and
“‘certainly impending . . . allegations of possible future injury’ are
not sufficient.”222

215

408 U.S. 1, 3 (1972).
Id. at 4–6.
217 Id. at 13.
218 Id. at 13–14. But see Slobogin, supra note 155, at 253–55 (noting limitations of the
applicability of Laird).
219 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
220
Id. at 415.
221 Id. at 415–18.
222
Id. at 409.
216
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This requirement for specificity and current injury is further
complicated because it is incredibly difficult to find plaintiffs who
have directly and concretely had their First Amendment rights to
anonymous speech affected by FRT. With respect to infringements
on the right to anonymous speech, plaintiffs must allege the system
or ordinance has been applied to them.223 This is particularly difficult with law enforcement and government agencies, who are not
transparent when it comes to detailing what techniques or mechanisms were used in apprehending a suspect.224 Simply showing that
the government had a FRT system near a plaintiff’s location is likely
insufficient to make a pleading that satisfies the specificity requirements of Twombly and Iqbal.225 And after making this showing, a
plaintiff must also clearly show that the FRT not only destroyed
their anonymity, but burdened their ability to speak or express themselves.226
On the other hand, potential plaintiffs could bring a chilling effects claim, which is likely less specific than traditional anonymous
speech cases addressed in Part I.A. Unfortunately, it is even more
difficult to bring these cases. The Court has stated that “‘[c]hilling
effect’ allegations [are] insufficient to establish a case or controversy” unless the allegations are “much more specific.”227 Further,
injunctive relief in these cases can be hard to come by without specific allegations of ongoing or imminent harm.228 This is especially
true with respect to state laws, which are a significant avenue for
FRT implementation since most law enforcement agencies are local
or state affiliated.229 And as the Court ruled in Clapper, what
223

Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 448–49 (1975).
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (discussing the FBI’s
investigation to identify potential terrorists after 9/11, but not detailing the specific means
of investigation).
225
For an account of the FBI’s lack of transparency when it comes to the use of FRT, see
Kade Crockford, The FBI Is Tracking Our Faces in Secret. We’re Suing., ACLU (Oct. 31,
2019),
https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/the-fbi-is-tracking-our-faces-insecret-were-suing/ [https://perma.cc/XNQ9-2N62].
226 See supra Part I.A.
227 Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1316, 1318–20 (1974).
228 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
229
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51–52 (1971) (“Just as the incidental ‘chilling
effect’ of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling
effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books
224
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adequately constitutes a sufficient allegation is a high bar that wades
into providing evidence prior to knowing what the government’s
program looks like.230 For example, respondents must have
knowledge of the government’s targeting practices in claiming they
were targeted.231 They must know whether methods under the alleged infringing statute were used or other methods were used.232
They must know whether such methods were successful in acquiring
communications.233 And they must not speculate as to whether their
own communications were impacted.234 These barriers are not mere
hurdles—they are mountains.
In contrast to Clapper, Meese v. Keene provides an example of
what concretely satisfies the standing bar, and it is not a reassuring
standard. In Meese, the Court considered whether the Department of
Justice’s labelling of the respondent’s film as “political propaganda”
violated the First Amendment.235 The Court found that labelling the
films “substantially harm[ed] [respondent’s] chances for reelection
and . . . adversely affect[ed] his reputation in the community,”
which was “more than a subjective chill” and satisfied the standing
requirement.236 This kind of concrete standing is not something FRT
surveillance victims can adequately allege.237
Finally, a note about private actors. In Thornley v. Clearview AI,
petitioners unexpectedly argued that they did not have Article III
standing because they wanted to keep their litigation in Illinois state
court, likely because the complaint alleged a violation of Illinois
state law.238 The Court found that because the complaint merely alleged a general regulatory violation and was not sufficiently
does not in itself justify prohibiting the state from carrying out the important and necessary
task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the state believes in good
faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.”).
230 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 411–14.
231
Id. at 411.
232 Id. at 412–13.
233
Id. at 414.
234 Id.
235 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 468–69 (1987).
236 Id. at 473–74.
237 Note that lower courts have noted that the chilling effect on anonymous speech might
be better challenged through other rights that have more cognizable harms. See, e.g.,
Hassan v. City of N.Y., 804 F.3d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 2015).
238
Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241, 1243–44 (2021).
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particularized, it did not satisfy Article III standing and must be
heard in state court.239 Thornley is a great example of strategic maneuvering to remain in state court where state statutory laws are violated or where state court might be friendlier than federal court.
Unfortunately, claims grounded in the First Amendment or against
the federal government cannot maneuver like this; by definition,
such claims fulfill Article III standing because they allege a violation of federal law.
In conclusion, for claims that are not against private parties and
allege First Amendment violations, potential plaintiffs will find it
hard to satisfy standing because of Clapper’s specificity standard,
creating a deterrent to litigation.
B. National Security Issues
FRT is used at the border and to prevent terrorism and similar
national security threats.240 By 2020, the DHS had scanned more
than 43.7 million people at the border using FRT.241 In addition, the
federal government uses FRT to prevent terrorism242 and track domestic terrorists.243 These uses fall within the purview of border security and national security. Unfortunately, the Court—and courts

239

Id. at 1248–49.
Tau & Hackman, supra note 194 and accompanying text.
241
About Face: Examining the Department of Homeland Security’s Use of Facial
Recognition and Other Biometric Technologies, Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of John Wagner, Deputy Executive
Assistant Comm’r, Office of Field Operations, U.S. CBP).
242 Bobby Allyn, Amazon Halts Police Use of Its Facial Recognition Technology, NPR
(June 12, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874418013/amazon-haltspolice-use-of-its-facial-recognition-technology
[https://perma.cc/C65C-PVS4]
(“American intelligence and military officials have long used facial recognition software
in overseas anti-terrorist operations, but local and federal law enforcement agencies inside
the U.S. have increasingly turned to the software as a crime-fighting tool.”).
243 Kashmir Hill, The Facial-Recognition App Clearview Sees a Spike in Use After
Capitol Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/
technology/facial-recognition-clearview-capitol.html
[https://perma.cc/K3WM-E7AA]
(noting that after the January 6th insurrection, “[t]here was a [twenty-six] percent increase
of searches over [Clearview’s] usual weekday search volume.”). For a more thorough read
of the federal government’s use of FRT, see generally KRISTIN FINKLEA ET AL., CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R46586, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46586.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EX5JA8H].
240
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generally—are deferential to the government’s claims that national
security issues might require abridgements of First Amendment
rights.
With respect to border security, the Court’s deference to executive authority is impressive, despite the guarantees of the First
Amendment. For example, Kleindienst v. Mandel addressed whether
the government could prevent a foreigner seeking to participate in
academic lectures about socialism from obtaining a non-immigrant
visa.244 The Court ruled that the respondent had no constitutional
right of entry as a nonimmigrant.245 Despite U.S. citizens’ First
Amendment right to receive information, Congress’ “power to make
rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess
those characteristics which Congress has forbidden” took precedent.246 The Court accepted Congress’ facially legitimate reasoning,
regardless of any First Amendment claim.247 A similar principle was
applied in United States v. Ramsey, this time noting the border
search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
in allowing border officers to search incoming international mail for
drugs.248 The Court permitted warrantless searches of international
mail at the border despite any chill to First Amendment rights, which
would be minimal and “wholly subjective.”249 In sum, where FRT
is used at the border, it is unlikely that the underdeveloped right to
anonymous speech would hold much water as compared to the risks
to national security and the other branches’ authority.
In addition to deference at the border, the Court generally defers
to Congress and the Executive when it comes to national security
issues. In Humanitarian Law Project, Chief Justice Roberts spent
several paragraphs quoting Congress and the Executive’s claims
about terrorism findings, stating that:
244

408 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1972).
Id. at 762.
246
Id. at 762–66 (quoting Boutilier v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123
(1967)).
247 Id. at 767, 770–79; see also Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment:
Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1554–56
(2010) (describing additional statutes that Congress has passed that allow for barring
nonimmigrants based on past speech).
248 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
249
Id. at 624.
245
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[The] evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like
Congress’s assessment, is entitled to deference. This
litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests
of national security . . . neither the Members of this
Court nor most federal judges begin the day with
briefings that may describe new and serious threats
to our Nation and its people.250
Additional examples of such deference include Ziglar v. Abbasi,
where the court declined to extend Bivens jurisprudence251 in a case
where foreigners who overstayed their visas were detained after
9/11 and were kept under a maximum security unit, strip searched,
and subjected to verbal and physical abuse.252 The Court emphasized the long line of cases discussing separation of powers principles and Congress’ desire for the Judiciary not to interfere so as to
not expand Bivens jurisprudence.253 Additionally, the Court noted
that discovery and litigation would require disclosure of Executive
discussion and deliberations, so instead the Court should defer to the
Executive in matters of national security.254 Similarly, in Hernandez
v. Mesa, the Court considered whether to extend Bivens to Fifth
Amendment claims in a case where a border patrol agent fatally shot
a Mexican child on Mexican soil.255 Because the shooting was a
cross-border incident and because the Executive plays the “lead role
in foreign policy,” the Court deferred to the Executive to prevent
inconsistent government decision-making that might be embarrassing.256

250

Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–34 (2010).
A Bivens claim allows plaintiffs to sue the federal government for violations of their
constitutional rights. The Court permits Bivens claims for violations of the Fourth and
Eighth Amendments and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390 (1971)
(covering Fourth Amendment violations); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 15 (1980)
(covering Eighth Amendment violations); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229–30 (1979)
(covering Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause violations).
252 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1847, 1869 (2017).
253 Id. at 1858.
254
Id. at 1861.
255 140 S. Ct. 735, 740–42 (2020).
256
Id. at 744–45 (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008)).
251
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While all three cases deal with issues of national security that
intersect with foreign policy, the Court’s message is clear: in such
cases, the federal government’s authority is nearly unquestionable,
and the Court should defer maximally. Because FRT is currently
used to track violent criminals, insurrectionists, drug smugglers,
prisoners,257 and foreigners who have overstayed their visas,258 it is
especially unlikely that the Court will muster the strength to override
Congress and the Executive’s policies. Finally, where probable
cause, investigatory powers, or seizure authority exists, First
Amendment claims can be defeated.259 Thus, the mountain becomes
steeper if the technology or techniques questioned implicate national
security, border issues, or crime-fighting.
C. Right to Collect and Disseminate Information, and Government
Databases
As noted in Part I.I.B, other parties’ rights to collect and disseminate information may prevent their First Amendment right to anonymous speech claims against private actors. Both because the jurisprudence is currently evolving, and because a deep analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, this Section briefly addresses two issues. First, whether private actors’ right to collect and disseminate
information supersedes other First Amendment rights. Second,
whether the government’s collection and compilation of data
through third parties—though not directly under the purview of the
right to collect and receive information—has been successfully challenged in the past.

257

See Matt Field, The Alarming Face of Facial Recognition, BULL. OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS (June 24, 2019), https://thebulletin.org/2019/06/the-alarming-face-of-facialrecognition/ [https://perma.cc/S2TC-JZN6] (describing the use of FRT in building cases
against local drug dealers).
258 HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT OF THE BIOMETRICS
SUBCOMMITTEE 39 (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/final_
hsac_biometrics_subcommittee_report_11-12-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FW6-PN5P]
(“[A facial recognition system] has been credited with identifying several hundred known
or suspected terrorists, in addition to criminals, drug smugglers, human traffickers,
murderers, child predators and gangs like MS-13.”).
259
See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019) (noting that because
probable cause existed to arrest respondent, it did not matter that the police may have been
retaliating to respondent’s taunts and speech, which fell under his First Amendment rights).
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Generally, given facial data’s wide availability and many permissible uses, it is unlikely that plaintiffs could plausibly complain
of its use by private parties under Sorrell.260 Branzburg, Rhinehart,
and Humanitarian Law Project indicate that some statutory and legal interests can precede the right to collect and disseminate information.261 However, it is unclear what right a potential plaintiff
would have here that would be able to trump a collecting company’s
First Amendment right to speech (as expressed through code262 and,
thus, the creation of facial recognition software), given the lack of
statutory protections. This is problematic given examples like Clearview AI, where data upon which the software relies has been acquired legally.263 The ability to speak anonymously is a right citizens hold against the government in preventing registration or tracking when conducting specific expressive speech.264 The right to privacy under the penumbra of the First and Fourth Amendments applies against the government and is unlikely to abridge a third
party’s right to speech.
More generally, the broad First Amendment right to speech of
private actors collecting data likely cannot be overcome by an individual’s right to privacy. This is because laws that protect individual
privacy rights will do so by preventing companies from collecting
specific types of content (such as facial data), which is subject to the
high bar of strict scrutiny.265 In addition, individual privacy interests
generally “fade once information already appears on the public record,” while the private entity using that information is protected by
the First Amendment.266 Further, the underlying assumption in
260

564 U.S. 552, 573 (2011); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
262
Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Ca. 1996) (“For the
purposes of First Amendment analysis . . . source code is speech.”).
263
See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526–28 (1989).
264 See supra Part I.A.
265
See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1113 (1999) (noting that anti-paparazzi laws are contentbased laws that are presumably unconstitutional). See generally Bambauer, supra note 67,
for a maximalist view of the First Amendment right to collect and disseminate and how
this right trumps privacy rights.
266
Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 532 n.7; see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 471–72
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have held that laws governing harm incurred by
individuals through defamation or invasion of privacy . . . must be measured and limited
261

678

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:630

challenging the use of FRT is that a subject’s facial data is either
collected in public, on the internet where it is collected through a
third party,267 or in a private space like a store where the private
entity’s rules and regulations apply. In all three instances, the individual’s privacy interests are different from situations in which the
individual’s information is held purely privately, such as keeping
information in a personal journal.268 In sum, any anonymity or privacy rights generated under the First and Fourth Amendments are
weak enough that they would likely be defeated by private entities’
own First Amendment rights.
Although not directly related to the right to collect and disseminate information, a further confounding factor is that the government often compiles fingerprint and DNA databases; these may also
affect the right to anonymous speech and privacy. Yet, neither type
of database has been challenged. For example, the Court held DNA
collection and analysis from arrested persons who are not convicted
as constitutional because the legitimate law enforcement governmental interest outweighed the minimally invasive privacy intrusion
of a cheek swab.269 Similarly, lower courts have generally accepted
maintaining collections of photographs and fingerprints based on a
Fourth Amendment balancing analysis, finding that the value of establishing the identity of an individual outweighs liberty and privacy
concerns.270 Further, the Supreme Court has noted that the collection
of fingerprint data, even outside the criminal context, is minimally
constrained by constitutional issues.271

by constitutional constraints assuring the maintenance and well-being of the system of free
expression.”); Anne E. Crane, Unsealing Adoption Records: The Right to Know Versus the
Right to Privacy, 1986 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 645, 654–55 (1986) (discussing how First
Amendment rights often defeat requirements for sealed records in adoption cases).
267 However, note that it is unclear whether this constitutes “the public record.” See
Crane, supra note 266.
268 See Zhu, supra note 36, at 2397, for a discussion of the private-public dichotomy.
Specifically, Zhu notes that under the secrecy paradigm, individuals lack a privacy interest
in data available from third parties or public records, at least when it comes to bringing a
privacy tort. Id. A similar analysis would apply here.
269 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 449–61 (2013).
270 David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric
Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1097–98 (2013).
271 See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“[B]ecause of the unique
nature of the fingerprinting process, [detentions for the purpose of fingerprinting] might,
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Thus, it is unlikely that a potential plaintiff’s right to anonymous
speech would defeat a private party’s First Amendment right to collect and disseminate information. And the government’s extant biometric databases indicate that a facial recognition system, though far
more invasive, is unlikely to succeed. Given this futile state of affairs, potential solutions must go through legislation and regulation.
IV. SOLUTIONS
This Article presents three avenues to protect the right to anonymous speech outside of litigation. The first is local and federal government legislation that prevents or pauses the government’s use of
facial recognition. Second are regulations against private actors. Finally, slowing the creation of facial recognition systems might also
be effective in preventing technological expansion until lawmakers,
ethicists, and technologists have a better framework to regulate the
technology.
A. Legislation and Norm-Setting Against the Government’s Use of
Facial Recognition
Prophylactic legislation is one approach to protecting rights.
This is not a novel concept, even within the realm of FRT. While
the right to anonymous speech is enshrined under the Bill of Rights,
Congress “bears a responsibility to enforce the Bill of Rights and it
has been particularly likely to act in the arena of surveillance regulation.”272 Even so, that may not be the case in a post-9/11, postbipartisanship world.
Local and state governments have led the way, approaching the
issue of facial recognition with the enthusiasm expected of the
under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment
even though there is no probable cause in the traditional sense.”); Schmerber v. California,
383 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (“[B]oth federal and state courts have usually held that [Fifth
Amendment privilege] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to
stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.”). See generally John
D. Woodward, Jr. et al., Appendix C: Legal Assessment: Legal Concerns Raised by the
U.S. Army’s Use of Biometrics, in ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS: IDENTIFYING &
ADDRESSING SOCIOCULTURAL CONCERNS 111, 111–66 (RAND 2001).
272
Strandburg, supra note 8, at 816.
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laboratories of democracy—which may be a blueprint for how the
federal government should react. So far, many cities, including
Berkeley,273 Boston,274 Cambridge,275 Minneapolis,276 New Orleans,277 Oakland,278 Pittsburgh,279 Portland,280 and San Francisco281
have all banned their respective cities from using FRT. Within these
bans, some do the minimum: preventing the city from using the technology.282 Others—like Berkeley, Boston, Minneapolis, and Pittsburgh—prevent law enforcement from using such technology as
well.283 Cambridge goes further, preventing the collection and use
of information obtained through such systems.284 New Orleans has

273

Levi Sumagaysay, Berkeley Bans Facial Recognition, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 16,
2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/16/berkeley-bans-facialrecognition/ [https://perma.cc/D38W-H2JM].
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276 Kim Lyons, Minneapolis Prohibits Use of Facial Recognition Software by its Police
Department, VERGE (Feb. 13, 2021, 9:48 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/13/
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[https://perma.cc/9NS8-DDW4].
277 Michael Isaac Stein, New Orleans City Council Bans Facial Recognition, Predictive
Policing and Other Surveillance Tech, LENS (Dec. 18, 2020), https://thelensnola.org/2020/
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banned such technologies from propagating predictive policing.285
And Portland has gone the full distance, banning even private businesses from implementing such technologies.286 This movement
isn’t limited to local governments: Vermont has banned law enforcement from using such technology.287
The benefits of enacting local and state legislation are numerous.
They are not hindered by congressional gridlock and are more
closely linked with local law enforcement organizations. Where
Congress is constitutionally limited in what prophylactic federal legislation it may pass, state and local governments are not.288 State and
local officials are also less insulated from public pressure and do not
generally capture the spotlight of national politics.289 More importantly, they serve as a measure of forward-thinking, more proactive legislation that can inform the Supreme Court and Congress
about what laws work and are constitutionally viable.290 And because state and local legislators do not have to deal with congressional gridlock, they can react quickly to technological developments, both in creating and reducing restrictions on the use of FRT.
Finally, these avenues are useful in resisting sharing information
285
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with federal agencies engaged in suspicious, but not unconstitutional activities.291
Congressional regulation is more difficult, but two approaches
may work. First, pushing the federal government for a temporary
moratorium on the use of such technology may be successful. Given
that the FBI, DHS, and the military are some of the most dangerous
users of FRT, a moratorium could be propagated through an Executive Order, which is comparatively easy to pass. If the government
wanted to regulate states’ use of FRT, then Congress would have to
exert its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority292 or Commerce Clause powers,293 though either approach would need the
right framing. And while Congress is gridlocked, lawmakers on both
sides of the aisle have shown interest in implementing at least some
restrictions on FRT use.294 In addition, Congress could include regulation providing best practices for the use and implementation of
FRT, including acceptable error thresholds, discrimination and algorithmic biases, types of data permissible in facial recognition databases, and permissible acquisition of data from private companies.295 Finally, Congress could more broadly consider developing
intellectual privacy norms that go beyond a warrant requirement just
for emails and toward warrant requirements for “intellectual records
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more generally.”296 This could include “heightened certification requirements” when requesting certain kinds of records, notice to
those whose facial information is accessed, and intellectual privacy
norms within institutions.297
B. Regulating Private Actors
While regulating government agencies is one avenue to protect
anonymous speech rights, any solution is incomplete without regulating the ways in which private actors collect data for FRT, how the
technology is developed, and when the data is sold to certain parties.
For example, the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
(“BIPA”) regulates the collection, retention, disclosure, and destruction of biometric identifiers and information by private entities.298
BIPA also creates a cause of action against entities that violate it.299
Since such a cause of action depends on the creation of legislation,
this kind of law is nearly necessary to regulate private actors, given
private actors’ own First Amendment rights discussed in Part II.B.2.
In addition to regulating the technology itself, governments
could regulate the source of data in the facial recognition database
so companies like Clearview AI would not be able to access information available online without explicit consent from the data subject. For example, the California Consumer Privacy Act requires notice and consent to sell or share data.300 Such a regulation could prevent nonconsensual use of data in facial recognition databases. Additionally, consumer rights to access their own data profiles and information collected about them in a private company’s database301—and similar rights to correct302 and delete303 such data—
might help curb development of such technology from the consumer’s end, or at least reduce wrongful identification that harm
296
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minority groups. Similarly, a data minimization principle may also
serve to limit the kind of data collected by companies, limiting the
data’s use to specific purposes provided in their notice and consent,
or limiting the data collected to provide a specific service requested
by a consumer.304 This way, if a company like Clearview AI collects
information from social media companies, the data may not be sufficiently valuable or meaningful for Clearview AI to use in its facial
recognition database.
Finally, legislation can prevent surreptitious data collection by
companies and subsequent transfer to the government. Such legislation could survive heightened scrutiny if framed in a manner where
the right to privacy is a legitimate governmental interest protected
by well-written, narrow legislation.305 The content of this legislation
should create conditions for FRT’s development and implementation. If legislation creates notice and consent requirements by FRT’s
developers such that those companies must notify individuals whose
faces are included in a database, consumers may have adequate notice. Alternatively, legislation could create a Freedom of Information Access-like requirement for companies developing such
technology so consumers could investigate whether their identity
exists within a company’s database.
Legislation could also require transparency reports that detail
companies’ interactions with the government, including government
demands to share and remove content; currently, such transparency
reports are voluntary.306 Most importantly, however, banning the
government from accessing private companies’ systems or using
such systems may be necessary given that government agencies own
and maintain “public forums, like parks and sidewalks, that private
[individuals] use for their own expressive activities, like protests and
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festivals” which greatly expands the impact of the government’s use
of FRT’s impacts on speech in public spaces.307 At the very least,
regulating transparency around what technologies the government
acquires and uses might help shed light on whether First Amendment rights are truly being impacted and whether potential plaintiffs
have standing.308
A possible challenge to such legislation is that companies have
a First Amendment right to regulate speech within their domains as
they see fit.309 But such legislation could also escape this problem
and the issues posed by Sorrell’s overly pro-collection and pro-dissemination approach to the First Amendment if the legislation defines data as a commodity, rather than speech.310 Combined with
Bartnicki’s dicta—that if the content of communication might inform future speech, that does not necessarily constitute current
speech—carefully written legislation could survive judicial scrutiny.311 But private actors may also come around to the notion of
procedural norms which might protect the right to anonymity, if users begin to demand such norms.312
C. Slowing the Creation of Facial Recognition Systems
Finally, a drastic method to prevent facial recognition systems
from proliferating is slowing or regulating the development of such
technology.
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In the wake of publicity regarding DHS and law enforcement’s
use of FRT, various companies unilaterally halted selling and developing these systems.313 Unilaterally pausing such developments
might be useful since this technology rests on iterative mechanisms
and algorithms that improve accuracy as more data is provided and
processed.314 Something like an AI winter, which puts a pause on
the development of a technology (in this case, AI),315 might provide
the government, lawyers, scholars, and ethicists with adequate time
to develop a framework to regulate this technology before it becomes invasively accurate to the point where any regulation is rendered futile. However, a unilateral pause might be hard to achieve
given the market’s competitive nature and the inherent collective
action problem with such a pause.
An alternative mechanism may be for the government to strictly
regulate the technology and prevent it from being shared or developed altogether. A model framework for this approach might be the
government’s regulation of cryptography during the 1990s, when
lawmakers feared it would stymie law enforcement or aid foreign
adversaries.316 While this approach generally failed as the internet
and associated technologies proliferated,317 it exemplifies an approach that might be useful in the near-term. Governmental regulation and development of nuclear energy may provide another framework. While private companies still develop nuclear reactors, there
313
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are significant safety, national security, and supply chain regulations
that ensure the government has a strong say in how the technology
is developed and used.318
However, this approach may ultimately benefit the government.
While it would prevent technology from expanding, it might also
grant the government a monopoly on FRT and prevent adequate reporting and transparency. Further, all FRT is not bad: consumers use
the same technology in their iPhones and when logging into their
computers. The key is ensuring that FRT is used in a rights-protective manner. Nonetheless, in the near-term, this might be a valuable
approach that gives legislators and technologists space to develop
an adequate legal framework.
CONCLUSION
FRT has only seen the tip of the iceberg in its development. The
exponential growth of this technology is unlikely to stop, considering the proliferation of AI, social media, computers, smartphones,
and cameras. Such technology will likely impact the ability to speak
freely in the public square, even if not protected by the First Amendments right to anonymous speech because of its constrained disclosure-based jurisprudence. Part of the problem is FRT’s nebulous impact on speech: chilling conversations and imposing implicit associations between who and what is said. This implicit registration system is far removed from the kinds of formal registration systems in
McIntyre319 and the long line of cases preceding it.
In addition, the right to anonymous speech is underdeveloped
and conflicts with other rights. The Court’s jurisprudence has become more constrained in recent years, creating hurdles to standing
and providing deference to the government’s national security and
policing responsibilities, no matter how erroneous. But the Court
has left the door ajar in the face of new technologies. Even so, litigation may not be the most effective avenue to promote freedom of
anonymous speech. This is especially so given that private actors are
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major users and developers of such technologies, and their own First
Amendment rights—which are more broadly recognized—might
conflict with the right to anonymous speech.
Instead, the ideal solution is legislation and regulation that ensures transparency and confines the use of such technology, if it does
not outright ban it. Greater FRT regulation will likely improve the
First Amendment’s ability to engender a marketplace of ideas, encourage democratic self-governance, bolster cultural democracy,
and help realize self-actualization and autonomy.320 While this Article only briefly evaluates such solutions, these are the fastest and
most efficient ways to prevent broad First Amendment rights from
being chipped away. In addition to these challenges and solutions,
lawyers and scholars should consider how the First and Fourth
Amendments intersect and how the penumbral right to privacy, in
combination with the right to anonymous speech and regulations on
searches and seizures, might protect civil liberties from being impacted.
There is still time before facial recognition systems become permanent, tracking our unchangeable faces. The law must deliberately
move to ensure these challenges are adequately handled and, with
that, burnish one of our most cherished civil liberties.
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